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OSHA Warrants and the Exhaustion
Doctrine: May the Occupational
Safety and ,Health Review
Cormmission Rule on The Validity of
Federal Court Warrants?
Robert E. Rader, Jr.*
Jane A. Lewis**
Douglas B. M. Ehlke***
I. Introduction
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970' is possibly the
most controversial legislation enacted in the last quarter century.
Coverage under the Act is comprehensive, governing virtually every
employer in the country. Accordingly, no other federal legislation so
pervasively affects or influences the affairs of American private in-
dustry.3
One of the most controversial aspects of the Act, the creation of
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, a three
member administrative tribunal appointed by the President,' has re-
* B.A., 1966, Harding College; J.D., 1969, Southern Methodist U.; McCarty & Wilson,
Ennis, Texas.
** B.A., 1973, U. of Pittsburgh; J.D., 1976, Dickinson School of Law; Associate, Thorp,
Reed, & Armstrong, Pittsburgh, PA.
*0* B.S., 1968, U. of Idaho; J.D., 1971, U. of Chicago; Professor, University of Puget
Sound School of Law.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1976).
2. See Comment, OSHA P. The Fourth Amendment: Should Search Warrants Be Re-
quired For "Spot Check" Inspections, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 283 (1977); Comment, Due Process
and Employee Safety Conflict IN OSHA Enforcement Procedures, 84 YALE L.J. 1380 (1975).
3. PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT; TRENDS
AND DEVELOPMENTS 9 (M. Stokes ed. 1974). See also Robbins, Truth and Rumor About
OSHA, 33 FED. B.J. 149 (1974), in which the author observes, "OSHA coverage is comprehen-
sive. Virtually every private employer, except those specifically exempted by virtue of cover-
age under other legislation and those who are self-employed, is included." As one Senator has
observed, OSHA applies to "every business affecting commerce in the entire United States,
ranging anywhere from a big steel company to a shoeshine shop." 116 CONG. REC. 36,509
(1970) (remarks of Senator Dominick). The Secretary of Labor estimates the Act covers nearly
five million worksites.
4. 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1976).
cently evoked considerable criticism and litigation. The latest con-
troversy involving the Review Commission concerns the
Commission's contention that it may exercise pure judicial authority
in OSHA warrant cases. Contrary to the Constitution's mandate of
separation of powers5 and even the Commission's own case prece-
dent,6 the executive agency now maintains that it possesses authority
to review the constitutionality of OSHA search warrants issued by
United States District Courts.7 An examination of the significance
and constitutional ramifications of the Review Commission's conten-
tion, however, indicates that the agency is without power to under-
take their current warrant review.
II. Background Of Warrant Litigation
A. Warrant Requirement in OSHA Inspections
Beginning with Brennan v. Gibson's Products, Inc. of Plano8 and
culminating in Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,9 the courts have uniformly
upheld the right of employers to insist on a valid search warrant
under the fourth amendment as a prerequisite to an OSHA inspec-
tion. After the Barlow's decision, however, the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) took the position that the only
probable cause showing required for an administrative inspection
warrant was the agency's determination that reasonable grounds to
believe a violation of the Act existed and that the magistrate could
not question the agency's decision to search.' Unfortunately, many
United States magistrates routinely issued OSHA's boiler-plate form
inspection warrants without questioning either the agency's decision
to inspect a particular employer, or the scope of the proposed inspec-
tion. The magistrates thus failed to fulfill their constitutional re-
sponsibility to make an independent determination of the
reasonableness of the requested search in each case, but rather "rub-
5. See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
6. See, e.g., Electrocast Steel Foundry, Inc., 6 OSHC 1562 (R.C. 1978), in which the
Commission flatly stated, "Initially we note that it is not within our authority to rule on the
validity of a search warrant issued by a U.S. Magistrate. The Commission is a creature of the
Congress and may proceed only in accordance with its delegated powers, which do not include
authority to review the actions of a U.S. Magistrate . Id. at 1563.
7. This newly-formulated position of the Review Commission is set forth in its July 17,
1979, decision in Chromalloy Am. Corp., 7 OSHC 1547 (R.C. 1979).
8. 407 F. Supp. 154 (E.D. Tex. 1976) (three judge panel).
9. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
10. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1979); In re Estab-
lishment Inspection of Northwest Airlines Inc., 437 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis. 1977), afld, 587
F.2d 12 (7th Cir. 1978). In the brief filed in Mosher Steel Co. v. Marshall, OSHD 23,630
(CCH) the Secretary makes the incredible statement that "the Secretary's determination to
respond to a complaint is not and should not be reviewable by a magistrate." This position is
contrary to the Supreme Court's reaffirmation in Barlow's, of the constitutional position of the
detached, neutral magistrate between the administrator and the regulated and the magistrate's
exercise of his time-honored function of determining the "reasonableness" of all warrant ap-
plications in light of the unique fact situation presented in each case.
ber stamped" OSHA's decision to inspect." Accordingly, employers
were faced with a Hobson's choice; permit an inspection pursuant to
an invalid warrant or risk contempt of court - an admittedly "poor
strategy for obtaining judicial review."12
Although employers did not desire to contumaciously disregard
federal court inspection warrants, neither did they desire to relin-
quish their constitutional right to be free from unreasonable OSHA
inspections. 3 Employers therefore took the only other course avail-
able: they permitted such inspections under protest and then sued in
the federal district court that had issued the warrant to have the war-
rant declared unconstitutional, the evidence obtained thereunder
suppressed, and any further administrative proceedings before the
Review Commission based on such illegally seized evidence en-
joined. 4
OSHA, on the other hand, argued that the employers must first
exhaust their administrative remedies before the Review Commis-
sion before seeking judicial review of the legality of both warrant
and search. The courts, however, generally refused to accept the
Commission's exhaustion argument 5 and held to the contrary that
sound judicial policy dictated the exercise of inherent jurisdiction to
11. This practice continues at the present time. The continuous, widespread failure of
OSHA to make a proper probable cause showing to obtain inspection warrants and the con-
comitant failure of magistrates to make an independent determination of the reasonableness of
the proposed search is reflected by numerous cases. See, e.g., Marshall v. Huffhines Steel Co.,
488 F. Supp. 1980 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Marshall v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 7 OSHC 1851 (W.D.
Okla. 1979); Marshall v. North Am. Car Co., 476 F. Supp. 698 (M.D. Pa. 1979), afg'd.- F.2d
8 OSHC 1722 (3rd Cir. 1980).
12. Blocksom v. Marshall, 582 F.2d 1122, 1124 (7th Cir. 1978).
13. Cases of OSHA harassment are legion. The Weyerhaeuser Company, for example,
was cited under the same corrugator noise standard seven times. In each case Weyerhaeuser
successfully contested the citations. The enforcement pattern against Weyerhaeuser consisted
of inspection followed by corrugator noise citation, employer appeal, dismissal, and reinspec-
tion, which started a repetition of the whole process. The Department of Labor even admitted
that they were out to "get" Weyerhaeuser. See BUSINESS WEEK, February 13, 1978, at 40.
Finally, after spending 1642 man hours of valuable working time and $43,200 in actual litiga-
tion expense, Weyerhaeuser began to demand valid search warrants. See Marshall v. Weyer-
haeuser Co., 456 F. Supp. 474 (D.N.J. 1978); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall, 452 F. Supp. 1375
(E.D. Wis. 1978); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Maurice S. Reisen, OSHD 22, 271 (CCH) (E.D.
Mich. 1977).
Weyerhaeuser is not unique. Many other employers have been subjected to the same type
of harassment and discriminatory enforcement by OSHA. See, e.g., Continental Can Co. v.
Marshall, 455 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ill. 1978), a§'d, 603 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1979); Mosher Steel
Co. v. Marshall, OSHD $ 23,630 (CCH); Baldwin Metals Co. v. Marshall, 7 OSHC 1403 (N.D.
Tex. 1979).
14. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1979); Morris v.
United States Dep't of Labor, 439 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D. Ill. 1977); Hayes-Albion Corp. v. Mar-
shall, 5 OSHC 1968 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Baldwin Metals Co. v. Marshall, 7 OSHC 1403 (N.D.
Tex. 1979); Mosher Steel Co. v. Marshall, OSHD 23,630 (CCH).
15. The Supreme Court reiterated in McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969), that
the exhaustion doctrine is a judicial doctrine "subject to numerous exceptions" and that
"[a]pplication of the doctrine to specific cases requires an understanding of its purposes and of
the particular administrative scheme involved." Id at 193. See also Ecology Center of La.
Inc. v. Coleman, 515 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1975). See notes 37 to 63 and accompanying text infra
(discussion of the exhaustion doctrine).
review the constitutionality of magistrates' issuance of the warrants
under attack.
16
B. Change Of Position By the Review Commission
Throughout the course of this warrant litigation, the Review
Commission conceded its lack of authority to rule on the validity of
search warrants issued by a United States District Court Magis-
trate. 7 After losing a number of these warrant cases on the merits,'
8
however, OSHA began an acknowledged campaign to deny employ-
ers access to federal court.' 9 Thus, in early 1979 the Review Com-
mission argued that the exhaustion doctrine must now be applied in
OSHA warrant cases because the Commission can and will rule on
constitutional challenges to federal district court warrants.2° In
short, the Review Commission now claims a power never before as-
serted by an administrative agency-the power to review the deci-
sions of the United States District Courts.
2'
Attempting to explain this abrupt reversal of position, the Com-
16. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1979); Baldwin Metals Co. v.
Marshall, 7 OSHC 1403 (N.D. Tex. 1979). As the Seventh Circuit reasoned in Weyerhaeuser,
In addition, we believe that considerations of sound judicial administration support
an exception to the general requirement of exhaustion in the case of an attack on the
validity of a warrant. The probable cause determination here challenged by Weyer-
haeuser was originally made by a United States magistrate. As magistrates are ap-
pointed, assigned duties, and generally supervised by the district courts, it is desirable
that the latter should be afforded the opportunity of reviewing a magistrate's proba-
ble cause determination. Yet, if exhaustion were required, appeal from the final
agency decision would lie directly to the court of appeals, bypassing the district court
altogether.
592 F.2d at 377 (citations omitted).
17. See Electrocast Steel Foundry, Inc., 6 OSHC 1562 (R.C. 1978). This fact was also
repeatedly admitted by attorneys for the Review Commission when arguing before the Sev-
enth Circuit in Weyerhaeuser and before the district court in Mosher Steel
18. The courts found the warrants invalid, suppressed the evidence, and enjoined further
administrative proceedings.
19. See, e.g., Brief for Review Commission at 11-24, Baldwin Metals Co. v. Marshall,
No. 79-2548 (5th Cir., filed Sept. 1979); Review Commission's Reply Memorandum to Plain-
tifi's Answer in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 4, Mosher Steel Co. v. Mar-
shall, No. 5A-78-CA-448 (W.D. Tex., filed April, 1979).
OSHA attempts to justify this campaign to deny access on the argument that district court
review of OSHA warrants will have a "devastating effect" on the streamlined enforcement
procedures provided by the Act. These procedures were designed to afford "prompt protection
to the endangered employees." The Review Commission's argument, however, is belied by its
own three-year backlog of cases. The same argument was made and rejected in Barlow's. See
436 U.S. at 324.
20. The Review Commission's newly formulated position is set forth in Chromalloy Am.
Corp., 7 OSHC 1547 (R.C. 1979). One case in which a Review Commission Administrative
Law Judge (hearing examiner) has already ruled on the constitutionality of a warrant is
Moulded Accoustical Products, OSHRC Docket No. 79.1274.
21. As a creation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Review Commission
has no general common-law powers, but only those conferred by the statute itself. See, e.g.,
Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Delta Airlines Inc., 367 U.S. 316 (1961). The Act gives the Commis-
sion power to review the substantive sufficiency of citations, penalties, and orders of the Secre-
tary of Labor. 29 U.S.C. §§ 658, 659 (1976). It does not grant the Review Commission the
authority to issue or enforce OSHA inspection warrants, much less quash warrants issued by
the United States District Courts.
mission argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Marshall v. Bar-
low's, Inc., that Section 8(a) of the Act requires inspections be
conducted with a judicially issued warrant resolved the constitution-
ality of the underlying statute and thus placed the Commission in a
posture in which it could consider and resolve constitutional warrant
issues without deciding the constitutionality of its own enabling leg-
islation.22
By this clever "pre-Barlow's" versus "post-Barlow's" argument,
the Review Commission now contends that it possesses the authority
to determine whether the district court acted constitutionally in issu-
ing a search warrant.23 According to the Review Commission, if the
agency decided the warrant issued by an officer of the district court
was not based on sufficient probable cause, the executive agency
could quash the court's warrant. Furthermore, if the agency deter-
mined that the district court's probable cause finding was too lim-
ited, it could consider evidence beyond the scope of the court's
warrant. Under these circumstances, the determination of a judge or
magistrate to issue a warrant becomes little more than an advisory
opinion to the Review Commission that the search is proper. The
Review Commission thus seeks to invert the posture of courts and
administrative agencies and arrogate to itself the power to review
federal district court actions. Clearly, the Supreme Court in Bar-
low's did not bestow upon the Review Commission either the au-
thority to determine constitutional probable cause questions or the
authority to review the constitutionality of the acts of the United
States District Courts. The Commission's action is nothing less than
a bold attempt to appropriate to itself pure judicial authority in vio-
lation of the Constitution's mandate requiring separation of powers
between the judicial and executive branches of government.24
III. Agency Review Of District Court Search Warrants Violates
Constitutional Separation of Powers
When the Supreme Court held in Barlow's that an employer
may demand a search warrant for an OSHA inspection, it required
that the warrant be issued by a judicial officer - not by OSHA or by
the Review Commission. 25 Since the unreasonable invasion of the
privacy of a commercial establishment by an OSHA inspector as-
sumes the same constitutional proportions as the unreasonable inva-
22. Chromalloy Am. Corp., 7 OSHC 1547, 1548 (R.C. 1979).
23. Id
24. This same principle was addressed in Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911),
in which the Supreme Court stated, "by the Constitution, neither the Secretary of War, nor any
other executive officer nor even the legislature, are authorized to sit as a court of errors on the
judicial acts or opinions of [an Article Ill] court." Id at 353 (emphasis added).
25. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978).
sion of one's home, 6 the intervention by a neutral member of the
judiciary was held necessary to ensure protection of fourth amend-
ment rights.
The power to construe the Constitution and protect its guaran-
tees is vested in the Supreme Court and such inferior federal courts
as are established by Congress in accordance with Article III of the
Constitution.27 The authority to issue warrants is granted to United
States Magistrates acting under the supervision of United States Dis-
trict Courts by provision of the Magistrates Act.28 The district court
therefore retains the inherent power to review the legality of its own
magistrate's process.29 That authority has never been and may not
constitutionally be delegated to any administrative agency.
30
The Review Commission contends, however, that the employ-
ers' right to a determination of these constitutional warrant questions
by an Article III court is preserved because the Commission's deci-
sion is subject to review in the appellate courts. 3' Nonetheless, this
argument fails because it advocates a sharing of judicial power in
violation of the separation of powers doctrine.32
Even if a sharing of judicial power to determine the validity of
the lower court's process between the court of appeals and the Re-
view Commission is constitutionally permissible, it is not permitted
by the Act. Under Section 11, "[tlhe findings of the Commission
with respect to questions of fact, if supported by substantial evidence
26. Id. at 312; See also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967).
27. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch.) 137 (1803).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(1) (1976).
29. See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 1979); Bruno v.
Hamilton, 521 F.2d 114, 116 (8th Cir. 1975); Morris v. United States Dep't of Labor, 439 F.
Supp. 1014, 1018 (S.D. 111. 1977).
30. In Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894), the Supreme
Court indicated that only the judiciary has the constitutional authority to determine the reason-
ableness of a governmental invasion of the privacy of a citizen. The Court declared that
"neither branch of the legislative department, still less any merely administrative body, estab-
lished by Congress, possesses, or can be invested with, a general power of making inquiry into
the private affairs of the citizen." Id at 478.
31. For example, in its brief to the Fifth Circuit in Baldwin Metals Co., Inc. v. Marshall,
the Review Commission argues that the "right to petition the court of appeals" preserves "the
right of the federal courts to ultimately render a judgment on matters first raised before the
Review Commission." See Appellant's Reply Brief at 6, No. 79-2548 (5th Cir., filed Nov. 29,
1979). This, of course, begs the question of whether the Review Commission has the authority
to rule on constitutional warrant questions in the first instance.
32. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), in which the Supreme Court
held that,
Notwithstanding the deference each branch must accord the others, the "judicial
Power of the United States" vested in the federal courts by Art. III, § 1, of the Consti-
tution can no more be shared with the Executive Branch than the Chief Executive,
for example, can share with the Judiciary the veto power, or the Congress share with
the Judiciary the power to override a Presidential veto. Any other conclusion would
be contrary to the basic concept of separation of powers and the checks and balances
that flow from the scheme of a tripartite government. We therefore reaffirm that it is
the province and duty of this Court "to say what the law is" with respect to the claim
of privilege presented in this case.
Id at 704-05 (citations omitted).
on the record considered as a whole, shall be conclusive. 33 Thus,
insofar as the Commission determines a factual basis for a magis-
trate issuing a warrant, the court of appeals is limited by the "sub-
stantial evidence" test in its review of that determination. Even if
the Review Commission does not purport to make a factual determi-
nation, no section of the Act independently authorizes the court of
appeals to perform a factfinding function.
In addition to the separation of powers requirement, the district
court must maintain jurisdiction over search warrants issued by
magistrates to assure that the compliance officer who conducts the
actual search adheres to the terms of the search order. Suppose, for
example, that the magistrate issues an OSHA inspection warrant
limited in scope to a particular hazard alleged to exist on the em-
ployer's premises and that the OSHA compliance officers knowingly
defy the warrant limitation. Deferring this matter to the Review
Commission or to the court of appeals denies the district court the
authority to enforce its own orders.34
Lastly, the neutrality of the officer who issues the search warrant
is an indispensible check by the judiciary upon the power of the ex-
ecutive branch.35 If the executive can ignore the scope (or other re-
strictions) of the warrant and the district court lacks jurisdiction to
protect or enforce its own order, that check is effectively removed.
The warrant requirement is meaningless if the district court's juris-
diction terminates upon issuance of the warrant. The magistrate's
signature will become the rubber stamp anticipated by Justice Ste-
vens in his Barlow's dissent.36 Just as the district court would retain
jurisdiction to determine whether a recalcitrant employer was in
contempt of its search order, it must also retain jurisdiction to assess
the actions of OSHA. Otherwise, the judicial function specifically
interposed into the process by Barlow's is rendered meaningless.
IV. Purposes Of Exhaustion Doctrine Absent When
Constitutionality Of A Warrant Is Challenged
The Review Commission's recent contention that it can rule on
constitutional probable cause and scope of warrant questions is an
attempt to circumvent judicial rulings that exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies is not required in warrant cases.37 These decisions find
33. 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1976).
34. See Morris v. United States Dep't of Labor, 439 F. Supp. 1014, 1018 (S.D. 111. 1977).
This is not an abstract example. The most recent case of this type occurred in September, 1980
in Newton, Kansas involving a company called Koehn & Associates, Inc.. To date, no federal
court action has been instituted by the employer.
35. See Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 323 (1978); See v. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541, 545 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 529 (1967).
36. 436 U.S. at 332.
37. See cases cited in note 14 supra
exhaustion unnecessary because the factors underlying the creation
of the exhaustion doctrine are absent in an action challenging the
constitutionality of a district court's warrant and the administrative
remedies are inadequate to examine the constitutionality of both
warrant and search.38
By arguing that it can now rule on probable cause and scope of
warrant issues, the Review Commission hopes to convince the courts
that the administrative remedies are now adequate, and, therefore,
must be exhausted. After losing a number of warrant cases in the
federal courts on constitutional grounds, it is understandable that
OSHA prefers to keep such cases before its own Review Commission
administrative law judges.39
Notwithstanding the Review Commission's position, however,
the Supreme Court reiterated in McKart v. United States" that the
exhaustion doctrine is a judicial doctrine "subject to numerous ex-
ceptions" and that "[a]pplication of the doctrine to specific cases re-
quires an understanding of its purposes and of the particular
administrative scheme involved."'" For example, when constitu-
tional questions are involved, exhaustion may be required only when
(1) it is necessary to develop a factual record to aid in determining a
constitutional question; (2) the agency decision may make the consti-
tutional issue moot; (3) specialized and complex issues require appli-
cation of agency expertise; and (4) the agency should be given a
chance to correct its own errors.
42
None of the above reasons for requiring exhaustion are present
when a district court's warrant is under constitutional attack. On the
contrary, the only issues present are legal, not factual: that the war-
38. See notes 14-17 and accompanying text supra.
39. Moulded Accoustical Products, Inc., OSHRC Docket No. 79-1274, provides an in-
sight into the manner in which the Review Commission will deal with these constitutional
warrant questions. See notes 54-72 and accompanying text infra.
40. 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
41. Id at 193.
42. Id at 194-95. See also Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373, 376 (7th Cir.
1979). The Fifth Circuit has also noted that the doctrine "is not a strict jurisdictional matter
but a flexible concept tailored to the administrative statutes and circumstances." Ecology
Center of La., Inc. v. Coleman, 515 F.2d 860, 865-66 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Bancroft v.
Indemnity Ins. Co., 203 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. La. 1962), af'd, 309 F.2d 959 (5th Cir. 1962). In
Bancroft the court recognized that,
the rule that administrative relief must be exhausted before resorting to the Courts
did not originate in the Constitution, or any statute, but derived simply as a matter of
judicial policy created by the Courts, which do not apply it in hidebound fashion.
The rule will not be followed if there is good reason for making an exception, and
that has been done by both the federal and state courts.
203 F. Supp. at 54 (citations omitted).
Furthermore, complaints that an agency is violating either specific statutory language or
constitutional rights are exempted from the exhaustion rule. See Coca-Cola Co. v. FTC, 475
F.2d 299, 304 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 414 U.S. 877 (1973); OKC Corp. v. Williams, 461 F.
Supp. 540, 546 (N.D. Tex. 1978). See also Marrero v. Warden, 483 F.2d 656, 659 (3d Cir.
1973) rev'd on other grounds, 417 U.S. 653 (1974).
rant is supported by probable cause and its scope is not constitution-
ally overbroad.
A. Development of a Factual Record Unnecessary to Warrant
Constitutionality Determinations
The constitutional validity of an OSHA warrant is a question of
law that can be decided on the basis of the warrant application and
the warrant itself. When a warrant is challenged, the issue before the
court is the constitutionality of the act of its own magistrate - an
issue that the district court can determine simply by looking to the
warrant application to decide whether it met the requirements of ad-
ministrative probable cause, and to the warrant itself to determine if
it was suitably limited in scope:4 3 "There is no benefit to be derived
. . . from prior agency development of the factual record as the
court need only look to the face of the warrant application to decide
whether it met the requirements of administrative probable cause." 44
B. Determination of Warrant Constitutionality Does Not Require
Exercise of Agency Discretion or Specialized Agency Expertise
The second reason for requiring exhaustion - agency expertise
- is also absent when a warrant is challenged. Specialized agency
expertise with respect to health and safety matters within OSHA's
area of expertise "would not aid in the judicial determination of the
constitutionality of the administrative search and seizure. ' 45  The
threshold questions are whether the warrant was based on a suffi-
cient showing of probable cause and whether it was properly limited
in scope - constitutional questions that the OSHA Review Commis-
sion is powerless to resolve.46
43. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 1979). Accord, In re Es-
tablishment Inspection of Northwest Airlines, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis. 1978), aft'd,
587 F.2d 12 (7th Cir. 1978); Marshall v. Pool Offshore Co., 467 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. La. 1979).
44. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 1979).
45. Hayes-Albion Corp. v. Marshall, 5 OSHC 1968, 1969 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
46. Courts have specifically and consistently held that the Review Commission lacks the
authority to determine or rule on the constitutional question of whether an OSHA warrant is
based on sufficient probable cause. "That question is not one within the competency and ex-
pertise of the OSHA Review Commission." Morris v. United States Dep't of Labor, 439 F.
Supp. 1014, 1018 (S.D. Ill. 1977). Accord Barlow's Inc. v. Usery, 424 F. Supp. 437, 439 (D.
Idaho 1977), a#'d sub nom., Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978); Baldwin Metals
Co. v. Marshall, 7 OSHC 1403 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Hayes-Albion Corp. v. Marshall, 5 OSHC
1968 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
In E.I. Malone v. Burlington Northern Inc., 1979 OSHD 1 23,657 at 28,680 (CCH), it was
held, "The administrative expertise of the Review Board is limited to application of the Act.
The Board has no expertise regarding issues of probable cause. Such questions are within the
particular and exclusive expertise of the judiciary, and we do not presume to tread on that
unfamiliar territory .... "
C. The Constitutional Questions Cannot be Mooted by Agency
Decision
The Review Commission argues that exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies is appropriate because the Commission may ultimately
dismiss the citations against the employer and thus moot the consti-
tutional issue.47 Nonetheless, the fourth amendment injury resulting
from the illegal inspection remains even if the citations are dis-
missed. The Seventh Circuit made this very clear in Weyerhaeuser
Co. v. Marshall 
48
Nor is there any possibility of the agency decision mooting the
probable cause issue as the fourth amendment injury resulting
from the alleged illegal inspection will remain even if the citations
are dismissed ....
The injury resulting from an illegal inspection is clearly separate
from injury relating to the citations, as the former would exist
even if OSHA had found no violations of the Act. A company has
a Fourth Amendment right to conduct its business free of unrea-
sonable administrative inspections.49
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has stated that the administra-
tive remedy should be pursued only if the "administrative proceed-
ing might leave no remnant of the constitutional question."5
Clearly, the question of whether an employer's fourth amendment
rights have been violated remains unanswered even if the citations
are dismissed by the Review Commission. Thus, the constitutional
probable cause and scope of warrant questions cannot be mooted in
the agency proceeding, and exhaustion should not be required.
D. Requirement That the Agency be Given a Chance to Correct its
Errors is Inapplicable
One of the factors considered in determining the necessity of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is "how significant is the role
of administrative autonomy - the notion that the courts should not
usurp powers and duties entrusted to the agency, and the related no-
tion that 'the agency [ought to] be given a chance to discover and
correct its own errors.' "II In an OSHA warrant case no question of
usurpation of agency powers exists because the Review Commission
has no authority to issue or enforce warrants. Warrants are issued
by an officer of the court rather than the agency. Therefore, any
error in the issuance of a warrant is attributable to the court through
47. See note 99 infra.
48. 592 F.2d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 1979).
49. Id. at n.2.
50. Public Utils. Comm'n of Cal. v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539-40 (1958).
51. Ecology Center of La., Inc. v. Coleman, 515 F.2d 860, 866 (5th Cir. 1975), quoting,
McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 195 (1969).
its magistrate, not to the agency. Accordingly, the policy of allowing
an agency to correct its own errors is clearly inapplicable.
V. Requiring Exhaustion Would Be Futile
Not only are the factors underlying the utilization of the ex-
haustion doctrine absent when an exparte OSHA search warrant is
attacked on constitutional grounds, requiring its satisfaction is futile.
"[E]ven the federal courts do not require exhaustion when it would
be 'futile,' i.e., where it is fairly clear that the claim would be re-
jected." 52 Thus, when an agency has made its position clear and ex-
haustion imposes an exercise in futility, the courts should not require
it.53
The Review Commission's position on issues relating to the
proper scope of an OSHA warrant and search, the requisite probable
cause showing for such a warrant, and whether such warrants may
be issued exparte is clear.54 Although these issues have been ruled
upon by the courts,55 the Review Commission's position is directly
contradictory to the courts' interpretation and application of the
fourth and fifth amendments to administrative search cases.56 For
example, in Moulded Accoustical Products,57 the Review Commis-
sion held that a complaint of a specific violation at a specific location
on an employer's premises justifies an unlimited or "wall-to-wall"
search by OSHA.58 This position, however, has been repeatedly re-
jected by the courts, which hold that the scope of the warrant and
search must be limited to the alleged violation.59 Similarly, the Re-
view Commission has held that OSHA may obtain inspection war-
rants ex parte, even though the courts have held that due process
requires OSHA to abide by its own regulations, which require notice
52. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 446 (1965).
53. Id at 449.
54. See Moulded Accoustical Products, Inc., OSHRC Docket No. 79-1274. See also note
58 infra.
55. See cases cited in notes 60 & 61 infra.
56. Id
57. Moulded Accoustical Products, Inc., OSHRC Docket No. 79-1274.
58. In MouldedAccoustical Products, the Review Commission judge incredibly reasoned
that a specific complaint justified a general warrant since it can be assumed that other viola-
tions exist - the complaining employee was just not sufficiently sophisticated to recognize
them. The opinion states, "A general inspection was reasonable in the instant case ... [be-
cause other] safety and health standards at .a place of employment may not be apparent to
[complaining] employees who normally do not possess any expertise in safety and health mat-
ters." Id slip. op. at 5.
MouldedAccoustical Products provides vivid evidence of what will happen to employers'
constitutional rights if the Review Commission has the authority to decide constitutional war-
rant questions.
59. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978); Marshall v. Trinity Indus. Inc., 7
OSHC 1851 (W.D. Okla. 1979); Marshall v. North Am. Car Co., 8 OSHC 1722 (3rd Cir. 1980);
Marshall v. Pool Offshore Co., 467 F. Supp. 968 (W.D. La. 1979); In re Establishment Inspec-
tion of Northwest Airlines, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis. 1977), aft'd, 587 F.2d 12 (7th Cir.
1978); Whittaker Corp. v. OSHA, 6 OSHC 1492 (M.D. Pa. 1978).
and hearing to the business operator when a warrant is sought.60
Because of the Review Commission's warrant positions, when a
warrant is challenged "an attempt to secure relief by resort to the so-
called administrative remedies would clearly [be] futile and equity
does not require the doing of a useless thing."' 6' Accordingly, when
an employer institutes an action for declaratory and injunctive relief
based upon either an illegally obtained or executed warrant, "[a]
court of equity can furnish an appropriate remedy" 62 and futile ex-
haustion of administrative remedies should not be required.63
VI. Recent Circuit Court Decisions
The Seventh," First,65 Eighth,66 and Third67 Circuits have re-
cently examined the issue of whether exhaustion is required when
the constitutionality of an OSHA search warrant is challenged.68
A. Seventh Circuit Decisions
The Seventh Circuit was the first to address the question with its
decision in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall69 Weyerhaeuser, "under
protest," allowed OSHA to inspect pursuant to a search warrant.70
Based upon that inspection, OSHA issued citations and notice of
proposed penalties on July 25, 1977, and on August 5, 1977. 7 1 Wey-
erhaeuser contested the citations, and administrative proceedings
before the Review Commission were initiated. In November 1977,
however, Weyerhaeuser brought a declaratory judgment action in
the district court that had issued the warrant, requesting invalidation
of the warrant on the ground that it was issued on insufficient proba-
ble cause. In addition, Weyerhaeuser sought to suppress the evi-
60. The regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1979), requires notice and hearing to the business
operator when OSHA applies for a warrant. The courts have held that due process requires
OSHA to abide by its own regulation. See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 317-
19 (1978); Cerro Metal Prods. v. Marshall, 467 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Pa. 1979), afl'd, 620 F.2d
964 (3rd Cir. 1980); Marshall v. Huffhines Steel Co., 488 F. Supp. 995 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Mo-
sher Steel, OSHD 23,630 (CCH) (W.D. Tex. 1979).
61. Koepe v. Fontecchio, 177 F.2d 125, 128 (9th Cir. 1949). See School Bd. of Char-
lottesville Va. v. Allen, 240 F.2d 59, 64 (4th Cir. 1956), cerl. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957).
62. Koepe v. Fontecchio, 177 F.2d 125, 128 (9th Cir. 1949).
63. See cases cited in note 61 supra. See also JAFFE, supra note 52, at 449.
64. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1979).
65. In re Worksite Inspection of Quality Prods. Inc., 592 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1979).
66. Marshall v. Central Mine Equip. Co., 608 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1979).
67. Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Marshall, 610 F.2d 1128 (3d Cir. 1979).
68. Interestingly, when read in chronological order, the briefs in these cases clearly reveal
the change in the Review Commission's position and the evolution of its argument that it may
now review the actions of the federal courts in issuing OSHA search warrants. The Commis-
sion's new position is stated in its "final" form in the briefs filed in Baldwin Metals Co. v.
Marshall, No. 79-2548 (5th Cir., filed Sept. 1979), and Mosher Steel Co. v. Marshall, No. -
(W.D. Tex., filed March, 1979).
69. 592 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1979).
70. See 452 F. Supp. 1375, 1376-77 (E.D. Wis. 1978).
71. Id at 1377.
dence obtained under the warrant, to have the citations and penalties
quashed, and to enjoin any further administrative proceedings based
upon the citations.7 2 The Secretary of Labor and the Review Com-
mission filed motions to dismiss the district court action because of
Weyerhaeuser's failure to exhaust administrative remedies.73
The district court determined that "no significant interest would
be furthered by requiring [Weyerhaeuser] to present the issue of the
warrant's validity at the administrative level"74 and granted the re-
lief sought by Weyerhaeuser." The Seventh Circuit subsequently
affirmed because no factual record or specialized agency expertise is
necessary to determine the constitutionality of an OSHA inspection
warrant. Moreover, an agency proceeding could not moot the con-
stitutional question regarding the legality of the search.
The Seventh Circuit additionally held that "considerations of
sound judicial administration" require district court review of the
"magistrate's probable cause determination."76 Accordingly, "if ex-
haustion were required, appeal from the final agency decision would
lie directly to the court of appeals, bypassing the district court alto-
gether."77 Thus, the Weyerhaeuser decision follows an unbroken
line of authority to the effect that exhaustion is not required when
the constitutionality of a warrant is challenged.78
B. First Circuit Decisions
At first glance the subsequent First Circuit opinion in In re
Worksite Inspection of Quality Products, Inc. " appears opposite.
Upon close analysis, however, the two decisions are consistent. Al-
though the First Circuit ruled that Quality Products must exhaust its
administrative remedies before raising its challenge to an OSHA
warrant, the decision turned on the unique procedural posture of the
case and Quality's failure to make "a sufficiently clear showing of a
fourth amendment violation to justify" the extraordinary relief
sought by the company.8"
Procedurally, Quality Products concerned a motion to "stay and
72. Id at 376.
73. Id
74. Id at 1377.
75. Id at 1380.
76. 592 F.2d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 1979).
77. Id See also Morris v. United States Dep't of Labor, 439 F. Supp. 1014, 1018 (S.D.
Ill. 1977). In line with this policy, the Seventh Circuit in Blocksom & Co. v. Marshall, 582
F.2d 1122 (7th Cir. 1978), remanded to the district court with instructions to determine
whether the OSHA warrant in that case had been issued upon an adequate showing of proba-
ble cause.
78. See cases cited in note 15 supra.
79. 592 F.2d 611 (1st Cir. 1979).
80. Id at 616.
recall" an inspection warrant.8 The court held that entertaining
such a motion, unrelated to any ongoing federal court proceeding,
would encourage piecemeal litigation and waste judicial and govern-
mental resources.82 The court, however, specifically declined to hold
that a district court cannot curtail abuse of its own process by sup-
pressing the evidence in a different administrative proceeding.83 In-
stead, the First Circuit noted that a challenge to a warrant may
properly be made "through a complaint commencing an independ-
ent action under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201,
2202, and seeking a declaratory judgment invalidating the warrant
and an injunction prohibiting OSHA's use of the inspection's
fruits."
84
The First Circuit recognized that district courts have jurisdic-
tion to review the constitutionality of their warrants and required
Quality to pursue the administrative proceedings only because the
company had not followed the proper procedure or made the neces-
sary allegations to justify the extraordinary relief sought. Unlike
Weyerhaeuser, Quality challenged the warrant on statutory in addi-
tion to constitutional grounds.85 The First Circuit believed that ex-
haustion should be required regarding the "question of statutory
construction, '8 6 but noted that any remaining constitutional proba-
ble cause questions "would not be considered by the [Review] Com-
mission."87 In short, Quality was not entitled to a district court
judgment declaring that the search had violated its fourth amend-
ment rights because the company had not brought an independent
declaratory judgment action, as in Weyerhaeuser. Under its motion
"to stay and recall," which was treated as a motion to suppress,
Quality was only entitled to have the citations dismissed - which
could happen in the administrative proceeding on a nonconstitu-
tional question of statutory construction.
88
It is important to understand that the First Circuit did not base
its decision on the traditional purposes of the exhaustion doctrine.
To the contrary, the court specifically noted that it would not be nec-
essary to make a factual record in order to determine the constitu-
tionality of the warrant since "the contention gives rise to a question
of law that can be decided on the basis of the papers that were
presented to the magistrate ... 89 Similarly, the court confirmed
81. Id at 612.
82. Id at 614 n.4.
83. Id at 615 n.6.
84. Id at 615 n.5.
85. Id at 616.
86. Id at 615 n.7, 616.
87. Id at 615-16.
88. Id
89. Id at 616.
that the Review Commission could not rule on the probable cause
challenge.9"
C. Eighth Circuit Rulings
The Eighth Circuit case of Marshall v. Central Mine Equipment
Co.9' was procedurally similar to Quality Products. In Central Mine
OSHA applied for a warrant based on an employee complaint of
specific unsafe conditions.92 The magistrate issued OSHA's stan-
dard, boiler-plate, form warrant authorizing an unlimited wall-to-
wall search.93 Central Mine permitted the unlimited inspection
under protest and then filed a motion to quash the warrant on the
grounds that it was not supported by sufficient probable cause and
was, in any event, unconstitutionally overbroad.94 Central Mine also
moved to suppress the evidence obtained under the warrant even
though no citations had been issued as a result of the search.95
Finding that the warrant was indeed overbroad, the lower court
quashed the warrant, suppressed the evidence obtained thereunder,
and ordered the issuance of a new warrant limited in scope to the
basis of the complaint. The exhaustion issue, however, was not
raised in the lower court.
Appealing the district court's order, OSHA raised the exhaus-
tion issue for the first time in the appellant Secretary of Labor's reply
brief. Although the Eighth Circuit agreed that the original warrant
was unconstitutionally overbroad in scope, 96 the court was con-
cerned because no citations had ever been issued against the com-
pany. The court therefore felt that a motion to suppress evidence
was, at best, premature: "if the Secretary elects or has elected not to
bring an enforcement proceeding against Central Mine, we cannot
hold that the plaintiff is suffering or will suffer from any irreparable
harm that warrants the exercise of equitable jurisdiction." 97
Like Quality Products in the First Circuit, Central Mine failed
to bring an independent declaratory judgment action.98 Therefore,
the company was not in a position to request a district court judg-
ment declaring the search unconstitutional.99 Instead, based on its
90. Id.
91. 608 F.2d 719 (8th Cir. 1979).
92. Id at 720.
93. Id
94. Id.
95. Id. at 721, 722.
96. Id. at 720 n.l.
97. Id at 722.
98. Id. at 720.
99. Three "wrongs" or types of injury exist that can result from an OSHA search pursu-
ant to an unconstitutional warrant: (1) The right to be free from unreasonable searches is
violated by the illegal search itself, see Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373 (7th Cir.
1979); (2) if an employer is required to litigate constitutional probable cause and scope of
motion to quash the warrant and suppress the evidence, the com-
pany could only request that such evidence be suppressed in the ad-
ministrative proceeding. No administrative enforcement proceeding
had yet been initiated, however.' °°
Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit held that in the absence of ei-
ther a specific statutory basis for jurisdiction (such as a declaratory
judgment action), or a showing of irreparable harm, exercise of the
district court's jurisdiction was premature and inappropriate.' 0' It
must be noted, however, that consistent with Seventh and First Cir-
cuit rulings, the Eighth Circuit did not hold that the district court
lacked jurisdiction to review its magistrates warrant, 1°2 nor that the
Review Commission possessed the authority to rule on probable
cause or scope of warrant issues.
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D. Third Circuit Opinions
Notwithstanding the decisions in the First, Seventh, and Eighth
Circuits, the Third Circuit recently accepted the Review Commis-
sion's exhaustion argument. The Third Circuit's decision in Babcock
& Wilcox Co. v. Marshall1° is both understandable and unfortunate.
In Babcock the court held that the employer must exhaust its reme-
dies in the administrative tribunal before seeking relief in the federal
courts on its constitutional challenge to OSHA inspections.
0 5
The Third Circuit's decision is understandable because Babcock
did not move promptly to obtain judicial protection, but waited for
warrant questions before the administrative agency, the constitutional guarantee of separation
of powers has been lost, see notes 25-36 and accompanying text supra, and (3) if the employer
is required to defend against illegally obtained or "unconstitutional evidence," see Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961), in the administrative proceeding, it constitutes "a denial of the
constitutional rights of the accused." Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). See
also One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965); Savina Home Indus.,
Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979).
In both Quality Products and Central Mine, the employer did not bring the proper type of
action, procedurally, for the court to rule on the first type of constitutional "wrong." The
courts in both cases assumed that the Review Commission would not review the constitutional
probable cause and scope of warrant questions - thus obviating the second type of "wrong."
Whether the third type of "wrong" could occur was speculative in both cases. In Central Mine,
the possible requirement of defending against "unconstitutional evidence" was purely conjec-
tural since no enforcement proceedings had been initiated. In Quality Products, the court felt
that the initial validity of the citations could turn on a question of statutory construction.
Therefore, the question of the use of "unconstitutional evidence" might never occur.
100. 608 F.2d at 721, 722. In this respect Central Mine is factually similar to the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Hunsucker v. Phinney, 497 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, which is
the seminal case on "equitable jurisdiction." In Hunsucker, as in Central Mine, no enforce-
ment proceedings had begun. Accordingly, in the absence of either a specific statutory basis
for jurisdiction (such as a declaratory judgment action) or a showing of irreparable harm, no
equitable reason existed for the exercise of jurisdiction.
101. 608 F.2d at 722.
102. Id at 721, 722.
103. Id at 721 n.3. The Eighth Circuit clearly presumed that the Review Commission
would not rule on such issues and felt no need to discuss the matter further.
104. 610 F.2d 1128 (3d Cir. 1979).
105. Id at 1141.
seven months after the last of three searches before bringing its ac-
tion in federal court. 0 6 The court strongly believed that Babcock
had waited too long and that the company could not engage in settle-
ment conferences and complete pretrial discovery (by both sides)
before seeking judicial relief "on the eve of the scheduled hearing
before the Review Commission."'0 7
In addition, the court felt that numerous factual questions con-
cerning the warrants and searches necessitated the making of a fac-
tual record. Indeed, the Third Circuit distinguished the Seventh
Circuit's Weyerhaeuser decision on this basis:
The Weyerhaeuser court was influenced in deciding that ex-
haustion was not required by its perception that the development
of a factual record in ruling on probable cause was not necessary,
since such a determination could be made by looking at the war-
rant application alone. If afactual record were superfluous in this
case, we might also consider it afactor to be weighed against requir-
ing exhaustion. . . . It is apparent here . . . that there are many
disputed issues offact relevant to the constitutional claims. 108
The Third Circuit therefore concluded that at least one of the
factors underlying the utilization of the exhaustion doctrine - the
need to make a factual record - was present. The Babcock court
believed that findings of fact were required regarding whether the
inspections were wall-to-wall and whether the magistrate's handwrit-
ten notations on the warrants were made for the purpose of limiting
the otherwise boiler-plate, broad-form warrant.' °9 Because an ap-
pellate court lacks facilities for making these factual findings the
Third Circuit held that the Review Commission is the appropriate
106. OSHA conducted three inspections under the allegedly unconstitutional warrants in
late August and September 1978. Each search led to the issuance of citations, which were duly
contested, and the administrative review process was initiated. The case was assigned to an
administrative law judge on December 1I, 1978, and on December 18 the parties were directed
to commence a settlement conference. Trial was originally set for March 12, 1979, but was
reset for May 9 to enable the parties to continue discovery. On April 20 Babcock filed suit in
the district court to quash the three inspection warrants, and on May 3 Babcock filed its com-
plaint for declaratory and injunctive relief.
107. 610 F.2d at 1140. Throughout its opinion the court emphasizes that Babcock simply
waited too long,
Far from acting expeditiously to prevent the issue it now presses from becoming afait
accomp' Babcock waited over seven months after the last disputed inspection oc-
curred before filing its motion in the district court. . . .The dispute here. . . evades
review . . . because of the appellant's lack of prompt action.
Babcock's conceptualization of the Review Commission proceedings interrupting ju-
dicial review particularly lacks credibility because Babcock did not even move
promptly to obtain judicial protection from the use of the evidence secured in the
allegedly illegal search. The worksite inspections were completed in September 1978,
and Babcock did not attempt to quash the inspection warrants until approximately
seven months later.
Id at 1134, 1136.
108. Id at 1139 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
109. Id.
trier of fact." 0 Although logical on its face, the court's conclusion on
this point is unsound.
Certainly, one reason for requiring exhaustion is the develop-
ment of a factual record by the agency to relieve the court of the
burden of deciding "important and difficult" questions of constitu-
tional law devoid of a factual context." Factual questions regard-
ing the magistrate's intent in making written notations on the
warrants, and whether the scope of the search actually carried out
violated the magistrate's instructions, however, are better and more
appropriately determined by the district court. Under the Third Cir-
cuit approach, the district court is now deprived of the authority to
enforce its own process, a result certainly not intended by the Magis-
trate's Act, which vests authority over federal magistrates in the dis-
trict courts. " 1
2
The Third Circuit also reasoned that the appellate court could
not decide whether OSHA's warrant request was reasonable" 
3
"without a well developed factual record detailing the basis for
OSHA's inspection scheme.""' 4 It is well established, however, that
"OSHA's inspection scheme" in general is immaterial in passing on
the validity of a particular search warrant.' '5 To the contrary, the
critical question is: what information did OSHA present to the magis-
trate? It is axiomatic that "in passing on the validity of [the search]
warrant, the reviewing court may consider only information brought
to the magistrate's attention.""' 6 Since the probable cause presented
to the magistrate is contained in the warrant application and sup-
porting affidavit, clearly, no additional factual record is needed.' I
The Third Circuit's analysis of the need for a factual record
(and hence exhaustion) in Babcock, while faulty, is at least under-
standable. Its analysis of Review Commission authority is not. Sim-
ply stated, the Babcock decision appears to hold that the Review
Commission has jurisdiction and authority to rule on constitutional
probable cause and scope of warrant questions - ie., to review the
110. Id at 1137, quoting, Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 607 F.2d 871, 876 (3d Cir. 1979).
111. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall, 592 F.2d 373, 376 (7th Cir. 1979), citing, W.E.B. Du-
Bois Clubs of America v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309, 312 (1967).
112. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
113. The court was referring to the "reasonable administrative inspection program" man-
dated by the Supreme Court in Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 320-21 (1978).
114. 610 F.2d at 1140 n.42.
115. In re Establishment Inspection of Northwest Airlines, Inc., 587 F.2d 12, 15 (7th Cir.
1979).
116. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 413 n.3 (1969), quoting, Aguilar v. Texas, 378
U.S. 108, 109 n.1 (1964) (emphasis in original). See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Marshall, 592 F.2d
373, 376 (7th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. Horn Seed Co., 7 OSHC 1182, 1184-85 (W.D. Okla.
1979).
117. As the Seventh Circuit correctly noted in Weyerhaeuser, "the court need only look to
the face of the warrant application to decide whettaer it met the requirements of administrative
probable cause." 592 F.2d at 376.
constitutionality of a United States District Court determination to
issue an OSHA search warrant."'
The Third Circuit apparently believed that Congress intended
the Review Commission to rule on such constitutional warrant ques-
tions as a part of its regular adjudicatory functions." 9 The legisla-
tive history of the Act, however, reveals Congress' intent that the
Review Commission's sole purpose is to adjudge alleged violations
of health and safety standards promulgated under the Act. 120 Con-
gress plainly did not contemplate granting the Review Commission
authority to review acts of the federal district courts.'
2'
Determining that the Review Commission can rule on probable
cause and scope of warrant issues, the Third Circuit dismissed the
argument that such agency authority unconstitutionally violates the
separation of powers doctrine:
If the challenge [to the warrant] is raised by Babcock, the problem
for the Review Commission will be whether to use the evidence
obtained from the inspection. In deciding whether to use this evi-
dence the Review Commission must, of course, make its own
judgment as to the propriety of the warrant, but such a determina-
tion does not reverse the magistrate's action, nor does it contra-
vene a judicial order. The OSHA official would not be in
contempt if he were to decide not to execute a warrant signed by
the magistrate, and an administrative tribunal does not flout the
authority of the judiciary by refusing to consider evidence that has
been obtained pursuant to a warrant issued by a judge or magis-
trate. 
22
The court's reasoning, however, evades the relevant issue. The
critical point is that only the judicial branch has the constitutional
authority to determine whether a particular governmental invasion
of privacy is reasonable under the fourth amendment. The courts,
not the Review Commission, are the "protectors" of our constitu-
tional rights. 23 While an administrative agency is certainly free to
118. 610 F.2d at 1138-40.
119. Id at 1140.
120. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REC. 35607-08, 37317-47, 38366-403 (1970).
121. It is inconceivable that Congress could have intended the Review Commission to rule
on warrant questions because Congress intended to establish an OSHA enforcement program
containing the power to inspect work places without resort to search warrants! As an author of
the Act commented in early 1977, in response to the district court's initial decision in Barlow's,
[l]t is important to note that warrantless civil inspections are both absolutely essential
to this act's enforcement and longstanding Federal practice.
When we passed this Act, we not only acknowledged that similar inspection au-
thority was essential . . . , [w]e admitted as much by unanimous action as well as
words, for no bill was introduced, reported or passed in either House which did not
include such authority.
123 CONG. REC. H163, H164 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1977) (remarks of Congressman Steiger).
Indeed, the minority report on the original bill, HR 16785, protested the warrantless
search provisions of the proposed bill and thus confirms Congress' intent to authorize warrant-
less searches. See H.R. REP. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1970).
122. 610 F.2d at 1136 (footnote omitted).
123. See notes 25-36 and accompanying text supra.
conduct an investigation that is more restricted in scope than that
determined by the court to be "reasonable," the agency may not re-
view the court's determination of reasonableness.'
24
For example, consider the typical employee complaint situation
in which the judge or magistrate determines that under the fourth
amendment probable cause only exists to conduct a carefully limited
search of a particular employer's premises, and, therefore, limits the
scope of the warrant accordingly. OSHA, however, disregards the
limitations placed upon the search by the Court's warrant, conducts
a wall-to-wall search, and issues citations based upon evidence ob-
tained from the search. 25 When the Review Commission fails to
suppress the evidence obtained in the wall-to-wall search, 26 it has
effectively overruled the authority of the judiciary, and the court's
prior determination of reasonableness, and thus violated the separa-
tion of powers guaranteed by the constitution. Additionally, the
Commission has condoned the unconstitutional invasion of the em-
ployer's privacy and forced the employer to defend against "uncon-
stitutional evidence."' 27 Babcock, insofar as it upholds the authority
of an executive agency to review the judiciary's determination of
what constitutes a reasonable invasion of an employer's privacy
under the fourth amendment, is inconsistent with the constitution
and judicial precedent.
Furthermore, the Babcock decision distressingly encourages
employers to contumaciously disregard district court search war-
rants: "Direct review of the issuance of a civil warrant may be ob-
tainable before the inspection by resisting entry . . . . [I]llegal
OSHA searches will not inevitably evade review; they may be pre-
served for determination by the district courts if the plant operator is
willing to risk civil contempt . . 128
Requiring an employer to risk the penalty of contempt as the
price for obtaining a fair judicial determination of his fourth amend-
ment rights is manifestly unfair'29 and results in erosion of the re-
124. See notes 24 and 30 supra.
125. OSHA practitioners know that this action is the norm, rather than the exception. It is
especially interesting how often such wall-to-wall inspections result in citations for everything
imaginable except the originally complained of violation.
126. The Review Commission will, as a matter of course, decline to suppress such evi-
dence. See Chromalloy Am. Corp., 7 0SHC 1547 (R.C. 1979).
127. See note 99 and accompanying text supra.
128. 610 F.2d at 1135, 1136.
129. This philosophy underlies the ruling in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
When a defendant is charged with an offense for which conviction might result from proof of
his possession of certain items, he need not claim possession of them to gain standing to chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the search in which they were uncovered. If, as the Supreme
Court held in Jones, it is unfair to require the defendant to aid in his own conviction as the
price of obtaining a judicial decision on his fourth amendment rights, then it would seem
equally unjust to exact the price of actual conviction if that decision is adverse to him. See
LaFave, Administrative Searches and the Fourth Amendment." The Camara and See Cases, 1967
SUPREME COURT REV. 1, 28-29.
spect and authority properly due orders of the United States courts
- in this instance, the warrants issued by United States Magis-
trates. 3' The Third Circuit's holding that an employer must risk
contempt in order to obtain district court review of the validity of its
own warrant' 3 ' also fails to provide proper protection in those situa-
tions in which the OSHA inspectors physically force entry 32 or the
agency threatens to bring criminal contempt proceedings if the em-
ployer refuses entry.'
33
Notwithstanding the legal irregularities and practical problems
evidenced, the Babcock decision is colored by the particular em-
ployer's laches in seeking judicial relief and should not serve to es-
tablish the authority of the Review Commission to review the
constitutionality of federal court warrants or to impose an absolute
exhaustion requirement in cases challenging OSHA warrants.
VII. Conclusion
If an employer permits the OSHA inspector to execute the war-
rant, either because the employer accepts his duty to honor the
court's process or because the employer is unwilling to suffer the
consequences of contempt, the employer should not be foreclosed
from commencing a proper post-inspection action to challenge that
process. Such a challenge should not be relegated to inadequate ad-
ministrative proceedings, nor should the OSHA Review Commission
be allowed to rule on probable cause and scope of warrant issues.
Rather, the district courts should be permitted to exercise the inher-
ent jurisdiction necessary in such cases to control their own process
and to preserve the fourth amendment rights of society.
In turn, this procedure will assure that warrants remain judicial
orders subject to the respect and deference that the public at large
130. Since the Review Commission has changed its position and urged that it can rule on
probable cause and scope of warrant issues, OSHA practitioners nationwide have been forced
to advise their clients to refuse OSHA entry even with a search warrant, in order to obtain
district court review of the legality of the warrant.
131. Not only does OSHA first invoke the jurisdiction of the district court in applying for
the warrant, the warrant is issued by an officer of the court, and the OSHA compliance officers
admittedly act as "agents of the court" in executing the warrant.
In a May 8, 1979, letter to Senator John Tower concerning the case of Baldwin Metals Co.
Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety and Health Eula Bingham flatly states that "where
a warrant is issued the subsequent actions of OSHA are accomplished as agents of the Court."
See Brief for Appellee, app B, Baldwin Metal Co. v. Marshall, No. 79-2548 (5th Cir., filed
Sept. 1979).
132. In Mosher Steel, for example, the OSHA compliance officers arrived on Mosher's
premises accompanied by a deputy United States Marshall and literally, physically forced
their way into Mosher's plant, over the strong protests of company representatives who were
prepared to risk contempt in order to gain a district court hearing.
133. Unlike civil contempt, in which the invalidity of the underlying order is a good de-
fense, United States v. UMWA, 330 U.S. 258 (1947); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,
221 U.S. 418 (1911), in a criminal contempt proceeding the employer can be prosecuted
notwithstanding the invalidity of the warrant. See Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458-59
(1975).
has traditionally afforded judicial acts. The burden on the judicial
system of the occasional post-warrant challenge should not be sub-
stantial. When courts and the Department of Labor better under-
stand the nature of OSHA inspection warrants, fewer and fewer
warrants that are legitimately subject to contest will exist, and em-
ployers and employers' counsel will come to accept the warrants at
face value.
